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This paper develops BernardWilliams’s suggestion that for philosophy to ignore
its history is for it to assume that its history is vindicatory. The paper aims to offer
a fruitful line of inquiry into the question whether philosophy has a vindicatory
history by providing amap of possible answers to it. It first distinguishes three types
of history: the history of discovery, the history of progress, and the history of change.
It then suggests thatmuch of philosophy lacks a vindicatory history, for reasons that
reflect philosophy’s character as a humanistic discipline. On this basis, the paper
reconstructs Williams’s conception of what it means for philosophy to engage with
its own history. The paper concludes that it is a mistake to think that a vindicatory
history is what we would really like to have, and that in fact, the resulting picture
gives philosophy several reasons to engage with its own history.
ABSTRACT
Introduction
T he American philosopher Gilbert Harman displayed a notice on his officedoor which read: “History of Philosophy: Just Say No!” “Just Say No!” was
theReagan administration’s slogan for thewarondrugs, soHarman in effect likened
the history of philosophy to a recreational drug; but, as he later explained, he also
wanted to encourage the thought that “the history of philosophy tends not to be
useful to students of philosophy,” just as it is “not particularly helpful to students of
physics, chemistry, or biology to study the history of physics, chemistry, or biology.”1
On this view, the pursuit of philosophy has no more to gain from knowledge of its
history than the pursuit of science from knowledge of its history.
In response toHarman, I want to develop a brief but suggestive remark of Bern-
ardWilliams’s, to the effect that in order to find out whether philosophy can ignore
its history, we need to look at its history. To put it less paradoxically: whether a field
of knowledge can ignore its history or not is determined by the kind of history it
has. One necessary condition for a field to be justified in ignoring its history—i.e.
to be justified in conducting systematic debates without regard to past debates that
1 Harman, quoted in Tom Sorell: On Saying No toHistory of Philosophy, in: Analytic Philosophy
and History of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 43–60, 44.
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are more than a few decades old—is that the field must have a history that is vindic-
atory.To assume that philosophy can ignore its history is therefore to assume that
philosophy has such a vindicatory history. But for much of philosophy, Williams
thinks, this is an “enormous and implausible assumption.”2
My aim in this paper is to offer a fruitful line of inquiry into the question
whether philosophy has a vindicatory history. I begin by providing a map of pos-
sible answers to this question. A fieldor a subfieldof inquiry can, I argue,possess any
one of three different types of history,which I label the history of discovery (§1), the
history of progress (§2), and the history of change (§3). I offer reasons to think that
much of philosophy lacks a vindicatory history, and for some of the same reasons
that leadWilliams to conceive of philosophy as a humanistic discipline. I then argue
that it is a mistake to think that a vindicatory history is what we would really like to
have (§4). Indeed, after reconstructingWilliams’s conception of how philosophy
should engage with its own history (§5), I argue that not being vindicatory lends
the history of philosophy a potential it would not otherwise have (§6).
1. History of Discovery
The first type of history I want to characterise is what I shall call the history of dis-
covery. Suppose we wanted to know of a given field of inquiry howwe came by our
current outlook in this field. The best explanation of how we came by this outlook
would have to include an account of whywe came to think in the terms articulating
the outlook. Of course we might have picked up these concepts at school, or use
them because everyone else does, butwhy, ultimately, did we come to think in these
terms? An answer to this question has the form of a history of discovery if what gave
us reason to use a particular concept at the same time gives us reason to think that
some of our beliefs involving this concept are true. For example, the best explana-
tion of why we came to think in terms of electrons can itself deploy the concept of
electron—for instance, by presenting us as being, via various measurement devices,
suitably sensitive to the presence of electrons—and thereby directly vindicates some
of our beliefs about electrons, such as the belief that electrons exist. A history of
discovery thus conforms to the following schema:
Ultimately, we came to use the concept of x because we are suitably sensitive to truths about
x.
2 BernardWilliams: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, in: Philosophy as a Humanistic Dis-
cipline (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006) 180–99, 192.
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Contrast this with the case of ethical beliefs: the best explanation of why we came
to think in terms of, say, cruelty will have to appeal to history, psychology, and
anthropology to explain why we use this rather than some rival concept, and none
of this will do much to vindicate our beliefs about cruelty. It is here, at the level of
howwe explain our thinking in certain terms, thatWilliams thought the interesting
differences between science and ethics were to be found.
Where the history of our concepts takes the form of a history of discovery, it
is vindicatory, because it represents us as having got something right. This in turn
has implications for how we should expect the rest of history to have run. If our
beliefs are connected to how the world actually is in the way in which a history of
discovery represents them as being connected, this gives us a prima facie reason
to expect anyone, at any time, to have converged on similar beliefs. If history belies
this, we need to ask why it is that in earlier times people did not hold similar beliefs.
We need a “theory of error.” In the case of beliefs about electrons, we have a theory
of error. The same facts about electrons that explain why we came to hold certain
beliefs about them also explain why these facts would have remained inaccessible
to any insufficiently technologically advanced society.
OnWilliams’s view, the case of our beliefs about electrons generalises to much
of the scientific outlook. Much of science can claim a history that is vindicatory
because it takes the form of a history of discovery, and because it is coupled with
a suitable theory of error. In good part, this is what licenses science’s insouciance
towards its own history.
Can we think of philosophy along similar lines? It has, of course, been tried.
An example is the intuitionist approach to moral epistemology advocated by G.E.
Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A. Prichard. They thought of intuitions as intuitions
of something, as a form of discovery. This led them to ignore history and to try
to ground their outlook in their intuitions. But this ahistorical approach comes
to have implications for how we would expect history to have run. In its most
primitive form, the thought that intuitions enable a form of discovery generates the
expectation that different generations will converge on similar outlooks. Yet this,
most obviously in ethics and political philosophy, is not the history we know.We
therefore need a theory of error for these cases. But the problem is that we cannot
give one in philosophy thewaywe can in physics.Why did theGreeks not figure out
the workings of electrons? Because they lacked the technology. But why did they
not figure out human rights?Here it seems that knowledge of history, togetherwith
the lack of a theory of error, gives us reason to deny an epistemically substantive
interpretation of intuitions.
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2. History of Progress
I turn now to the second way in which history can be vindicatory, namely by being
a history of progress. The distinction between the history of discovery and the his-
tory of progress is not one whichWilliams explicitly draws, but it is implicit in his
remarks on the history of discovery. One condition for a history to be a history of
discovery, Williams writes, is that
the later theory, or (more generally) outlook,makes sense of itself, and of the earlier outlook,
and of the transition from the earlier to the later, in such terms that both parties (the holders
of the earlier outlook, and the holders of the later) have reason to recognize the transition
as an improvement.3,4
This condition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a history to be a his-
tory of discovery and actually captures a broader kind of vindicatory history, which
is what I shall call a history of progress. The history of an outlook will be a history of
progress to the extent that it fulfils the following condition: each transition from
an earlier outlook to a later one is such that it can, in principle, be recognised from
both perspectives as a rational transition. Here the best explanation of how we
came by our outlook concerning x need not make reference to x in order to be
vindicatory. There is a shared conception, at each stage of development, of what
the arguments are about, which allows our outlook to emerge as having won an
argument. This presupposes shared standards and forms of argument, a common
conception of what counts as a reason for what.
Now any history of discovery will also be a history of progress, but not vice
versa. The latter category is wider. In both types of history, there will be crises, but
when the history is one of discovery, the crises will primarily be crises of explanation:
even against the background of widespread agreement on what would count as an
explanation, certain observations will constitute anomalies resisting explanation
within the prevalent theory, thus precipitating the kinds of crises Thomas Kuhn
has described.5 When the history is not one of discovery, by contrast, the crises will
primarily be crises of confidence or legitimation: the prevailing legitimations of au-
thority will cease to be convincing—perhaps because they come to seem flawed, or,
3 BernardWilliams: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, op. cit., 189.
4 This leaves it open whether the relation in question is supposed to be transitive: if the holders
of outlook A and the holders of outlook B recognise the transition from A to B as a rational
transition, and if the holders of outlook B and the holders of outlook C recognise the transition
from B to C as a rational transition, must the holders of outlook A and the holders of outlook
C also recognise the transition from A to C as a rational transition? As far as I can see, Williams
does not answer this question, although his talk of progress certainly encourages answering it in
the affirmative.
5 Thomas Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970).
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more fundamentally, because those towardswhom the authority is to be legitimated
lose confidence in the concepts in terms of which the legitimation is articulated. An
example is the loss of confidence, signalled by the work of Grotius, Hobbes, and
Pufendorf, in the legitimation of political authority in terms of divine authority.6
These thinkers sought a new basis of legitimation in consent. The history of such
transitions to new bases of legitimation will then be a history of progress only if
the transition from one basis of legitimation to the next is a rational one, which
in turn presupposes continuity at the level of what counts as a rational transition.
Williams readsThomasNagel, for instance, asmaintaining that liberalismhas such a
history of progresswithout discovery,becauseNagel takes liberalism to be grounded
in universal reason. “To reason,” Nagel writes, “is to think systematically in ways
that anyone looking over my shoulder ought to be able to recognize as correct.”7
To whichWilliams’s reply is: “Anyone? So I am reasoning, along with Nagel, in a
liberal way, and Louis XIV is looking over our shoulder. He will not recognize our
thoughts as correct. Ought he to?”8 If we assent to this, we condemnmost of the
people that ever lived to wrongness; but we also once again incur the obligation to
provide a theory of error, an account of why Louis XIV failed to be responsive to
universal reason. Needless to say, Williams does not think that such an account is
forthcoming.
3. History of Change
We come now to the third type of history. ForWilliams, much of our philosophical
outlook can neither lay claim to a history of discovery nor to a history of progress.
Though certain ideas won out, they did not win an argument, because their history
is the history of the very forms and standards of arguments which can be offered in
their support. For liberalism to have won an argument, proponents of the ancien
régime like Louis XIV would have had to share with early liberals a conception
of what the argument was about. There would have had to be a common aim in
light of which liberal ideas appeared as an advance upon their predecessors. But
onWilliams’s view, the historical changes involved were simply too radical for such
common aims to be available. And if liberalism failed to win an argument, then
its history is not vindicatory. It consists merely in what we may call a history of
change. Wemay of course still say that earlier outlooks were wrong, but, asWilliams
6 Jerome B. Schneewind: The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
7 Thomas Nagel: The Last Word (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
8 BernardWilliams: The Last Word, by Thomas Nagel, in: Essays and Reviews 1959–2002, ed. by
Michael Woods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 371–87, 385.
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remarks, “the content of this is likely to be pretty thin: it conveys only the message
that the earlier outlook fails by arguments the point of which is that such outlooks
should fail by them.”9
While Williams focuses on ethics and political philosophy in his discussion of
non-vindicatory histories, he suggests that his considerations go wider. One might
think that they apply, for instance, to parts of the philosophy of mind, such as the
shift from an Aristotelian conception of the mind to a Cartesian conception of
it.10 But such non-vindicatory histories—histories involving changes too radical for
there to be commonmeasures by which the transitions could be recognised as ra-
tional ones—canbe identified evenwherephilosophy is at itsmost general. Aproper
argument to this effectwould require a book-length treatmentwhichWilliams does
not provide, but AdrianW.Moore’s The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics offers
a proposal for what aWilliams-inspired view of the history of philosophy beyond
ethics and politics philosophy might look like. By “metaphysics,” Moore does not
mean philosophy as an extension of science, a kind of high-level physics, but philo-
sophy as “the most general attempt to make sense of things.”11 We need not accept
this as a characterisation of metaphysics; the point here is only that philosophy’s
history can be and has been construed as a history of change even beyond ethics and
political philosophy. FromDescartes to Dummett and Deleuze, Moore identifies
various incommensurable ways of sense-making, emphasising that while “making
sense” is a matter of being intelligible, “making sense of” something is a matter of
rendering it intelligible. Moore intends the associations of creativity to be taken
seriously here, for he takes philosophers to be in the business of devising ways of
sense-making, of fashioning concepts that make sense of things. The other point he
emphasises is that they should make sense of things to us. It is sense-making from a
human point of view, and it is in the service of human concerns and purposes that
candidate concepts for sense-making must prove their worth.
In highlighting the double grounding of philosophical sense-making in
socio-historically situated human agents—it is sense-making by them and for
them—Moore makes explicit what Williams saw as contributing to the humanistic
character not just of ethics, but of philosophy more widely. Williams characterises
philosophy as a humanistic discipline in good part because, in contrast to science,
much of philosophy does not aim at descriptions of the world as it is anyway, in
terms that aremaximally perspective-independent. It aims atmore local descriptions
9 BernardWilliams: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, op. cit., 191.
10 Charles Taylor: Philosophy and Its History, in: Philosophy in History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984) 17–30.
11 AdrianW.Moore: The Evolution ofModernMetaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1.
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of the world as we experience it, in terms that are more context-bound than those
of science, which is to say more closely tied up with culturally and historically
idiosyncratic practices and norms.12 On this view, the most helpful way of making
philosophical sense of things is unlikely to be the one which tries to draw as little
as possible on the conceptual resources that are specific to our own historical and
cultural situation. Rather, it will draw in various ways on the concepts and forms
of argument that make the most sense to us now.
But precisely for this reason, which is one of the reasons whyWilliams proposes
to understand philosophy as a humanistic discipline, much of the history of philo-
sophy is unlikely to be a history of discovery or of progress. Some of its history has
consisted in the restoration and protection of extant ways of sense-making; some of
it in the argumentative extension and amelioration of these ways of sense-making;
yet it has also consisted, to a considerable extent, in radical breaks with previous
ways of sense-making. These enabled us to make radically new sense of things by
introducing new concepts by which to live, new questions to ask, and new ways
of answering them. And it is precisely this novelty which bars these concepts from
counting, by some commonmeasure, as advancements over their predecessors. It
should thus come as no surprise if parts of our philosophical outlook lack a vindic-
atory history and are, in this sense, contingent.
4. Confidence Despite Contingency
Is this contingency a problem?When allwehave is amere history of change, thenun-
derstanding the history of our outlookmay seem to pose a threat to our confidence
in it. Confidence is what sustains and binds us to concepts,ways of thinking and sys-
tems of reasoning. This confidence in our concepts is evinced in our practices, in the
air of indubitabilitywithwhichweput them touse and accept the reasons that guide
and flow from the application of those concepts. But even where the reasons for ap-
plying a given concept and the reasons yielded by applying it are clear enough—the
reasons for categorising Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray as blasphemous, say,
and the consequences this has according to the laws of Wilde’s day—we can also
raise a more basic question—asWilde in effect did—namely whywe should think
in terms of blasphemy at all.13 Where reasons for doing this give out, whether we
go on living by the concept will be a matter of our confidence—confidence in that
concept itself, but also in the other concepts, beliefs, and attitudes it is tied up with
and from which it derives its point. If revealing the contingency of our outlook
12 BernardWilliams: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, op. cit., 184–87.
13 HarfordMontgomery Hyde: The Trials of Oscar Wilde (New York: Dover, 1973) 107.
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weakens this confidence, then knowledge of the history of philosophy will seem to
pose a threat to the practice of it.
One answer to this threat is irony in the style of RichardRorty.14 Rorty’s ironist
acknowledges that our outlook is contingent, not just in the sense that we might
have had a different outlook, but also in the sense that there is no conclusive argu-
ment for preferring the onewe happen to have over possible alternatives. As a result,
the ironist continues to live by the outlook in practice, but ceases fully to identify
with it at a more reflective level—at this level, the ironist adopts a detached stance
towards the outlook, considering it in no way superior to alternative outlooks.
Williams’s own answer, by contrast, is that once one goes far enough in recog-
nising contingency, the threat of a loss of confidence does not arise at all:
The supposed problem comes from the idea that a vindicatory history of our outlook
is what we would really like to have, and the discovery that liberalism, in particular (but
the same is true of any outlook), has the kind of contingent history that it does have is a
disappointment, which leaves us with at best a second best. But, once again, why should we
think that? Precisely because we are not unencumbered intelligences selecting in principle
among all possible outlooks, we can accept that this outlook is ours just because of the
history that has made it ours; or, more precisely, has both made us, and made the outlook
as something that is ours. We are no less contingently formed than the outlook is, and the
formation is significantly the same. We and our outlook are not simply in the same place at
the same time. If we really understand this, deeply understand it, we can be free of what
is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job as rational agents to search for, or at
least move as best we can towards, a system of political and ethical ideas which would be the
best from an absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent historical
perspective.15
As I read this dense passage, the appearance that there is a problem derives from
two ideas: first, that our outlook fails to have a vindicatory history; and second,
that a vindicatory history is what we would really like to have. It is in holding on to
this second idea that Rorty does not go far enough in recognising contingency. He
remains committed to two assumptions which Williams rejects: (i) that we must
strive for the ways of sense-making that are absolutely best; and (ii) that we must
do so as characterless selves. Against these ideas, Williams insists that our task is not
to find the concepts that are best from a point of view that is as free of contingent
historical perspective as possible. Our task is to find the concepts, the ways of sense-
making, that best make sense of the world to us; but what makes sense to us is in
turn a function of who we are and of which concepts shape our concerns, both of
which are largely a matter of contingent biographical and historical circumstance.
14 Richard Rorty: Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), chs. 3 and 4.
15 BernardWilliams: Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, op. cit., 193.
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Crucially, for Williams, these contingent influences are not a constraint to be over-
come,but ratherwhat enables our sense-making in the first place. The sense-making
self cannot be separated from everything that it contingently is—it is not, in the
first instance, biased by historical processes, but constructed by them.16 There is no
characterless self, and if there were, it would lack any basis for deciding between
outlooks. Consequently, it is neither an objection to the concepts we start out from
nor to those we end up with that they are contingent. The aim is not that our
concepts should be ultimately and timelessly desirable, but that they should be ours,
and that they should have a point for us. This is why revealing their contingency is
not in itself subversive.17
It does not follow for Williams, therefore, that we should lose confidence in an
outlook when it is found not to have a vindicatory history. On the contrary, the
fact that an outlook does not have a vindicatory history can be a gain in various
ways, because it bestows a potential upon philosophy’s preoccupation with its own
history that it would not otherwise possess. To understand how this can be so, it is
helpful to form an idea of Williams’s conception of how the history of philosophy
should be done.
5. History of Philosophy Between Anachronism and Antiquarianism
Williams’s conception of the history of philosophy comes out in his nuanced at-
titude to a remark attributed to Paul Grice, that we “should treat great but dead
philosophers as we treat great and living philosophers, as having something to say to
us.”18 Williams suggests that it is right to emphasise that the history of philosophy
should bemade to speak for the living—that it should be, in someway, in the service
of life, as Nietzsche put it.19 Yet he also suggests that it would be wrong to assume
“that what the dead have to say to us is the same sort of thing as the living have to say
to us.”20 A helpful way intoWilliams’s conception of the history of philosophy is
to situate it on a spectrum ranging from anachronism at one end to antiquarianism
at the other end.
On the one hand, Williams distances himself from what he perceives as the
16 BernardWilliams: Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 158–9.
17 See Matthieu Queloz: How Genealogies Can Avoid Genetic Fallacies and Continuity Failures
(manuscript).
18 Grice, quoted in BernardWilliams: An Essay on Collingwood, in: The Sense of the Past: Essays in
the History of Philosophy, ed. byMyles Burnyeat (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2006), 341-60, 344.
19 Friedrich Nietzsche: History in the Service or Disservice of Life, in: Unmodern Observations, ed.
byWilliam Arrowsmith (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1990).
20 BernardWilliams: An Essay on Collingwood, op. cit., 344.
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“triumphant anachronism” of some philosophers.21 In a late essay entitled “Why
Philosophy Needs History,”22 he approvingly cites Nietzsche’s dictum that “lack of
historical sense is the hereditary defect of philosophers.”23 InWilliams’s view, talk
of a hereditary defect is legitimated by the fact that while Nietzsche wrote this in
1878, Gilbert Ryle still cheerily encouraged his students to treat something written
by Plato as though it had come out inMind last month.24 This is anachronistic
not because it puts past philosophy to use in present terms, but because it does so
in a way that neglects or overlooks, to an unduly large extent, “the history that lies
between that philosophy and the present day.”25 History of philosophy in this style
yields philosophy, but its fault lies in its tendency to yield our philosophy.
On the other hand, Williams also follows Nietzsche in criticising antiquarian-
ism: the way of approaching the past which fails to relate it to the present at all by
resting content with an uncritical, unquestioning attitude of reverence of the old
because it is old. This antiquarian form of engagement with the past which gath-
ers “any old facts, merely for their own sake,” can, as Williams notes in Truth and
Truthfulness, “sustain an individual life, but in a larger scheme of things historical
research will not make sense unless it is driven by some question, and ultimately
by the prospect of some interpretation.”26 Antiquarianism fails to tie inquiry into
history back to our concerns as inquirers. A fuller discussion thanwe have room for
here would elaborate on the relation of antiquarianism toWilliams’s discussion of
the “Platonic” misunderstandings of the virtue of accuracy, and more particularly
of the ideal of personal disinterestedness.27 Antiquarianismmight be seen as such a
Platonic misunderstanding insofar as it takes accuracy to demand that inquiry tran-
scend human affairs altogether—that it be pure of any relation to our present-day
21 Bernard Williams: Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, in: The Sense of the Past:
Essays in the History of Philosophy, ed. by Myles Burnyeat (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2006) 257–64, 258.
22 BernardWilliams: Why Philosophy Needs History, in: Essays and Reviews 1959–2002, ed. by
Michael Woods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 405–12.
23 Friedrich Nietzsche: Human, All Too Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
I, §2. The formulation is of course ironic, since historical sense is precisely what is required to
recognise something as a hereditary defect (Nietzsche uses Erbfehler in the German original).
In this sense, those most afflicted by the defect will be those least well-equipped to recognise it
for what it is. However, Nietzsche’s own method in this work is not as historical as this quote
suggests. See Matthieu Queloz: Nietzsche’s Pragmatic Genealogy of Justice, in: British Journal
for the History of Philosophy, Early View (2017) 1–23.
24 BernardWilliams: An Essay on Collingwood, op. cit., 344.
25 BernardWilliams: Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, op. cit., 258.
26 BernardWilliams: Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2002) 146.
27 Ibid. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this. For a discussion of
Williams’s genealogy of the virtues of truth, seeMatthieuQueloz:Williams’s PragmaticGenealogy
and Self-effacing Functionality (manuscript).
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concerns.
In between these two extremes of antiquarianism and anachronism,we can situ-
ate the history of ideas (which is closer to antiquarianism than it is to anachronism),
and the history of philosophy (which is closer to anachronism than to antiquarian-
ism). The history of ideas is characterised byWilliams as having three features: (i)
it primarily yields history; (ii) it has a synchronic focus on a philosopher’s context
and contemporaneous influences; and (iii) it aims to identify what a philosopher
was doing in making an assertion in a particular historical situation.28
The history of philosophy, by contrast, is characterised by the following three
features: (i) it primarily yields philosophy; it is no surprise that the history of history
is a contribution to the discipline it gives the history of; but it is a remarkable fact
that the same is true of philosophy: the history of philosophy (in contrast to the
history of ideas) is also a contribution to the discipline it is the history of;29 (ii) it
has a more diachronic orientation, looking at past and future developments rather
than the contemporaneous context; and (iii) it aims to relate a philosopher’s ideas
to present philosophical concerns and to identify their influence on subsequent
history (which includes the influence they may have by being misunderstood).
Both the history of ideas and the history of philosophy, onWilliams’s concep-
tion, are meant to capture real mixtures of history and philosophy rather than to
form part of the demonology of the discipline. This is not to deny, however, that
they are partly incompatible mixtures. By exploring as far as possible the relations
of past ideas to present concerns, one is partly debarred from fully doing justice
to what they meant in their historical context. There comes a point at which one
faces a necessary trade-off. Williams aptly compares the situation to that of the
impressionist painter who, at some point, finds that one can only emphasise the
surface effects of light at the expense of information about structure.30
Williams’s ideal, then, is that the history of philosophy should be done philo-
sophically, so that it yields philosophy, but not so anachronistically that it yields our
philosophy.
6. Why Philosophy Should Care About Its History
What is the upshot, if we combine this conception of the history of philosophy
28 There are strong echoes of the view advocated by the “Cambridge School” of the history of ideas
in this characterisation. See Quentin Skinner: Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas, in: History and Theory 8 (1969) 3–53.
29 See AdrianW.Moore: The Evolution of ModernMetaphysics, op. cit., 585–90.
30 BernardWilliams: Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, op. cit., 257.
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with the insight that much of philosophy’s history may fail to be vindicatory?31
Wemay accept Williams’s view of the history of philosophy, and acknowledge that
philosophy’s historymaywell take the form of a history of progress or change rather
than of a history of discovery, but why should we care when doing philosophy?
At the most general level, the answer is that in any field of philosophy, engaging
with the history of our outlook and determining whether it has a history that is
vindicatory affects our reflective attitude towards the outlook. We can distinguish
three ways in which it does so.
First, it functions as a test of reflective stability: it can reveal us to be self-deceived
about the outlook’s history, or else strengthen our confidence in the outlook by
showing that it is in fact stable under historical reflection. In the former case, learn-
ing about the history of our outlook can reveal us to be self-deceived, for instance,
insofar as we mistake an outlook with a history of change for one with a history
of progress or even of discovery. As we saw, Williams accuses Nagel of claiming
authority for liberalism in terms of a history of progress where there is in fact only
a history of change. To the extent that liberalism depends on having a history of
progress, therefore, it will prove unstable under historical reflection.
In the latter case, learning about the history of our outlook leads us to find that
it is stable under reflection. This can strengthen our confidence in our outlook
by clearing it of suspicion. Here historical inquiry provides what we might call
negative vindication. It sounds out our ideas, and finds that although they may be
contingent, they are reflectively stable. This vindicates our outlook “in the sense
that we can understand it and at the same time respect it, support it and live within
it.”32 It also suggests that we can “urge it against alternative creeds whose own self-
understandings (as divine revelations, for instance) are themselves not going to
survive”33 this level of historical scrutiny. For Williams, this is often not just all the
vindication we can hope for, but all the vindication we need.
Second, whether we deceive ourselves about an outlook’s history or not, the
recognition that it does not have a vindicatory history makes a difference to our
reflective attitude towards the outlook, and it does so in twoways. On the one hand,
it changes how we think of the outlook’s relation towards alternative outlooks. It
makes a difference to what we are doing in saying that the earlier outlooks were
31 While this is a convenientway to put it,we should bewary of identifying the history of philosophy
with philosophy’s history. By “philosophy’s history,” I mean the development of philosophical
thought through the ages, while by “the history of philosophy,” I mean the activity of recovering
and engaging with that thought and its development (this parallels Kant’s distinction between res
gestae, things done, and rerum gestarum memoria, the memory of things done).
32 BernardWilliams: Why Philosophy Needs History, op. cit., 410.
33 Ibid.
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wrong; absent a vindicatory history, we are not showing that our outlook is better
by standards which could have been accepted by our historical opponents. Rather,
our outlook will have been found to be, at its basis, rationally contingent. This is
one reason why, in order to know what reflective attitude to take towards our own
outlook, we need to turn to philosophy’s history.
On the otherhand, realising that ouroutlook does nothave a vindicatory history
changes how we think of the outlook itself. What initiates philosophical inquiry is
at least in part the observation that various parts of our outlook seem contradictory
or incoherent to us. The history of philosophy can help us understand why this is
so—why, to take up again the example of liberalism, certain problems liberalism
has with ideas of autonomy are only to be expected, because these ideas inherit
enlightenment conceptions of the individual (such as that of a characterless, tran-
scendental self). This can inform the way we then go about making philosophical
sense of our outlook. Determining whether our outlook has a history that is vin-
dicatory helps us to distinguish between merely apparent contradictions, which
leave room for the hope that a sufficiently powerful analysis will allow us to resolve
them, and irreducible contradictions, which do not. In this way, for instance, the
history of philosophy can help us decide to what extent our ethical outlook should
be expected to yield to the rigid demands of ethical theory.34
Third and finally, it is precisely when the history of our outlook is not vindicat-
ory that the alternative outlooks unearthed by the history of philosophy acquire
a disruptive potential they would not otherwise have. The peculiar power which
the history of philosophy derives from the fact, whenever it is a fact, that philo-
sophy’s history is not vindicatory is, in Nietzsche’s words (whichWilliams quotes
approvingly), the power “to be untimely—that is, to act against the age, and by
so doing to have an effect on the age, and, let us hope, to the benefit of a future
age.”35 It becomes capable of challenging our preconceptions by enabling us to gain
an untimely perspective on our philosophical concerns, thus breeding a sense of
34 For instance because “oncewe regard the ethical life we nowhave as a genuinely historical and local
structure, one that is peculiarly self-conscious about its own origins and potentialities, we shall
have less temptation to assume that it is a satisfactorily functioning whole” (BernardWilliams:
Pluralism, Community and Left Wittgensteinianism, in: In the BeginningWas the Deed: Real-
ism andMoralism in Political Argument, ed. by Geoffrey Hawthorne (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2005) 29-39, 36–37). And about Truth and Truthfulness, Williams
remarks: “A fundamental claim of the book is a methodological one, namely that if we’re going to
understand the puzzles that surround these concepts now—and there are many such problems in
our present time—you can only understand them through historical knowledge of the concept”
(BernardWilliams: Truth and Truthfulness, in: What More Philosophers Think, ed. by Julian
Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom (London: Continuum, 2007) 130-46, 132).
35 Friedrich Nietzsche: History in the Service or Disservice of Life, op. cit., 88. Williams quotes
this passage in: Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, op. cit., 259, and in Bernard
Williams: Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 4.
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familiarity about what seems strange and reviving a sense of strangeness about what
seems familiar.36 We saw that for Williams, the history of philosophy (as opposed
to the history of ideas) was philosophy before it was history. This can sound as if he
meant that the voices of bygone ages can be heard as contributing to contemporary
debates. But this was precisely not the point. We cannot treat the history of philo-
sophy as contemporary without losing the point of historical distance; the history
of philosophy should yield philosophy, but it should not yield our philosophy. Just
because earlier philosophers were not always trying to answer the same questions
we are trying to answer, and just because things made sense to them that no longer
make sense to us now, they are uniquely positioned to upset the status quo, to initiate
the kind of disruption which incites creation. In this light, philosophy’s lack of a
vindicatory history will appear not as a loss, but as a gain.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have distinguished three types of history: the history of discovery,
the history of progress, and the history of change. I have suggested that much of
philosophy, for some of the same reasons that ledWilliams to call it a humanistic
discipline, may lack a vindicatory history. But I have also argued that it is a mistake
to think that a vindicatory history is what we would really like to have. Indeed,
the fact that philosophy’s history might not be vindicatory lends the history of
philosophy an importance and a potential it would not otherwise have. The history
of philosophy can function as a test of reflective stability, undermining or strength-
ening our confidence in our present philosophical outlook; it can function as a way
of developing our reflective attitude towards our own outlook and its relation to
alternative outlooks; and, especially when philosophy’s history is not vindicatory,
the history of philosophy can fulfil the function of challenging and disrupting our
present outlook, upsetting the status quo and opening up new avenues of thought
that would otherwise have remained invisible.37
36 BernardWilliams: Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, op. cit., 259, 260, 263.
37 Thanks to Marcel van Ackeren, Adrian W. Moore, Markus Wild, Martin Kusch, Johannes
Steizinger, Damian Cueni, Hamid Taieb, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful discussions
and comments. Thanks also to the audience at the 2016 symposium of the Swiss Philosophical
Society on philosophy and its history for which this paper was written.
